

does not always know what to make of it. For instance, he discusses Nietzsche after Darwinism. But surely, while all would admit the many-sidedness of that writer, which makes it difficult to decide how to classify him, it is nevertheless better to group him, as Höfding does, under the Philosophy of Value than as a post-Darwinian. The value theory of Nietzsche is certainly more important than his Evolutionism, although of course he has affinities in both directions. But, as has been observed, Professor Perry's treatment of value is not adequate. In this connection too he does not make what might have been a good point. Among English thinkers Edward Carpenter stands out as a radical critic of modern civilisation, far less brilliant than Nietzsche, but also without his vitriolic insanity. Professor Perry might have instituted a comparison between them and argued from it, that British revolutionary tendencies before the war were more wholesome than those of Germany. Yet Carpenter's name does not occur in the book, at any rate not in the index.

There are some misprints—page 153, foot-note, *inciting* for *In citing* : page 175, *tenanciously* for *tenaciously* : page 180, *Ketteler*, apparently for *Ketteler*. Also there is a slip of the pen on page 494, "British thinkers such as Froude, Mommsen and even Carlyle".

C. T. HARLEY WALKER.

The Philosophy of Mr. Bertrand Russell. Edited by P. E. B. JOURDAIN.
George Allen & Unwin. Pp. 96.

In this valuable work Mr. Jourdain has collected the writings of the late Mr. Bertrand Russell and published them with the addition of some further fragments found in that philosopher's interleaved copy of the *Prayer-Book of the Free Man's Worship*. The main body of the manuscript was rescued with difficulty (we are told in the preface) from the flames of Mr. Russell's house, which was set fire to by a number of enthusiastic upholders of the sacredness of personal property, on that fatal day in July, 1911, when the philosopher himself 'got into touch with reality' and was torn to pieces by Anti-Suffragists. Mr. Jourdain, with his usual passion for historical accuracy, has enriched the text with continual references to the works of other authors in the same field, such as Frege, Schröder, Russell, and John Henry Blunt (whose *Annotated Book of Common Prayer* is by the bedside of every symbolic logician.) He has also added a valuable appendix in which the logical views of Mr. Russell are compared point by point with those of the characters in Lewis Carroll's works.

I do not propose to enter in detail into Mr. Russell's views, which the reader can study for himself in Mr. Jourdain's book. Many of them have been made familiar to us since he wrote by Mr. Russell (whose life and writings present many curious parallels to those of his deceased friend). Perhaps the most important novelty of Mr. Russell's in logic is his proof that jokes form a hierarchy in the sense of the Theory of Types. He suggests the possibility of jokes of a transfinite order 'which excite the inaudible laughter of the gods'. Let us hope that they are all 'well ordered'.

There are just three points that need some discussion: (i) the case of the 'philosopher M.' who doubted that false propositions imply all propositions; (ii) the question whether Humpty-Dumpty was an Hegelian; and (iii) the question: Is the Mind in the Head? On the first and third of these matters I have some additional information to offer.

(i) Unless my memory altogether deceives me I was present in the rooms of the 'philosopher M.' when he expressed his celebrated doubt as to whether the proposition $2 \times 2 = 5$ implies M. is Pope of Rome. The

mathematician H. was present, and, on the spur of the moment, evolved the perfectly conclusive proof, given by Mr. Russell on page 40, that this implication does hold. So I think that the credit must go to the mathematician H., who is not mentioned in the present work.

(ii) I am not convinced by the arguments to prove that Humpty-Dumpty was an Hegelian. True, he could not understand mathematics. But, granted that no Hegelian can understand mathematics, so many other philosophers are in the same position that Humpty-Dumpty's defect does not add appreciably to the probability of his being an Hegelian. After all he might as well have been a Bergsonian. No doubt his synthesis of belt and cravat seems to favour the Hegelian hypothesis; but when we remember that Bergsonians are able to persuade themselves that colours *are* vibrations, we see that the confusion of a belt and a cravat (which are at least *in pari materia*) would be child's play to Humpty-Dumpty if he were a Bergsonian. Again, Humpty-Dumpty's preference for seeing the sum $365 - 1 = 364$ 'in writing' is much more in accordance with Bergson's views of mathematics than with Hegel's. Lastly, our historical information about the career and painful end of Humpty-Dumpty is strongly in favour of the Bergsonian hypothesis. Surely it illustrates only too clearly the *elan vital* dropping down into mere mechanism, from which 'all the king's horses and all the king's men' cannot restore it, thus furnishing an ideal first-order joke for Bergsonians. It cannot simply have been an Hegelian 'collapse into immediacy'; for that would have been followed by a synthesis, which, we are told, could not be accomplished in Humpty-Dumpty's case.

(iii) A new view as to the question of where the mind is was revealed to me lately by an observation overheard in a tea-room in Dundee. A lady at my table was pouring out for a family party and made some mistake about milk or sugar. She observed (in a Scots accent which, as a foreigner, I do not attempt to reproduce), 'I don't know where my brain can be; I'm sure it can't be in my head'. I conclude that she held the very unusual view that her *mind* was in her head permanently, but that it could only work on her body when her *brain* happened to be there too, and that her brain was liable to wander to other parts of her body.¹

In conclusion we may heartily recommend Mr. Jourdain's book to all who can appreciate jokes of orders above the first or desire to get some notion of the High Table at Trinity as it was before the war came and spoiled everything.

C. D. BROAD.

The Principles of Citizenship. By SIR HENRY JONES. Macmillan, 1919.

It was a happy suggestion of Sir Henry Hadow that led, as we learn from the preface to this little book, to the Y.M.C.A. asking Sir Henry Jones to write an account of the principles of citizenship for the classes in 'civics' which a year ago it was forming among our soldiers at the front. Like all that comes from its author, it is sympathetic, inspiring and, in the best sense of both words, at once philosophical and religious. It would have been this, had it been no more than a repetition of his University teaching for the benefit of a new audience. But it is more; it represents the fruit of his meditations when 'like numberless other persons, driven back upon' himself 'by the war' and 'obliged to ask whether after all' he and the science he professes have any use. These meditations

¹ Can she have been a disciple of Prof. Alexander? The question is perhaps unanswerable till his Gifford Lectures have been published; but she may have heard and possibly misinterpreted them.